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Morality is a concept that comes up in many facets of one’s life. Everyone is familiar
with the idea of morality, whether that be from parental teachings, in the court room, through
school honor codes, or some other aspect of one’s life. Moral dilemmas come up all the time, and
we seem to intuitively know what is right, or at least what feels right to us, even though we have
no blueprint for it. But what is morality at its core? Is it something that we as a society have
made up to establish order? Are morals real, and do they hold true for all beings? There has been
much debate over the topic of morality throughout history, with no definitive consensus. One of
these debates has centered around whether morals are real and objective. In this paper, I will be
defending the view known as moral realism against other views known as relativism and antirealism. I will be attempting to show that morality applies to all rational beings objectively, it is
non-naturalistic, and that it is real and must be understood as such for all moral beings.
Moral realism is the view that there are moral facts, these facts apply objectively for
everyone, and that these facts are opinion independent.1 It is not interpersonal discourse that
makes them valid. Rather, moral laws are true of their own merit.2 They are true independently
of any outside force, but this does not mean that moral agents accept these objective moral laws.
This distinction is very important to lay out because relativism and antirealism call these three
points into question. I support moral realism because it purports truth on actions that we make
and holds that they are universally applicable. This stance is advantageous because it holds moral
actors accountable to a universal standard and because it treats morality as something real and
not something that we have come up with for society. While there are objections to moral
realism, I think that moral realism is the most complete. One of the reasons that moral realism is
1
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a strong theory, and why I feel it is the most complete, is because it does not rely upon any
outside intervention, such as human intervention or misconception about what is real. Moral
realism being independent from all else allows morality to remain applicable for all beings
throughout time, and thus allows us to rely upon the same moral judgements throughout time.
This is also held by some of the other positions, but it is the truth of morals that really sets moral
realism apart. Moral laws being true and real means that they are also unchanging no matter what
any actor may think is moral. This is important because it shows why there are moral
discrepancies in the world and there is no set moral standard. Just because there are discrepancies
amongst different societies does not mean that the same moral truths do not also hold truth for
them. If morals are objective and real, then these truths exist for them regardless of their stance
of them. It also means that we do not need to necessarily know what these truths are. It holds all
actors accountable because it is real and not some false idea that some individuals back. For
example, if we take killing to be a true and real moral wrongdoing, then it does not matter what
the circumstance, location, or time period is, it is still morally wrong. This is good because total
moral correctness is something that we can strive and try to achieve no matter when we finally
get there. With the other theories this is not obtainable and leaves us in a place of simply obeying
moral ideas because it is what we think we should do and not what ought to be done.
In this essay, I will defend Schafer-Landau’s conception of moral realism. Shafer-Landau holds
that:

The way I would prefer to characterize the realist position is by reference to its
endorsement of the stance-independence of moral reality. Realists believe that
there are moral truths that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, in
the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by
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virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical
perspective.3
In other words, realists believe that moral truths are correct independently of anyone holding
them, that any moral agent may fail to recognize the moral truth regardless of their best efforts,
and that moral truths may potentially be accessible to moral agents eventually, ideal or
otherwise.4 I like this description of moral realism because it really emphasizes the independence
of morality from any subjective opinions. This set up also shows exactly the position of moral
realism that he will be taking, so as to not lead to any confusion later in the piece.
The first position that I will be defending against is moral relativism. Moral relativism is
the position that holds that there are moral facts but that they are opinion-dependent; right and
wrong is determined by the society and do not apply outside the society’s domain.5 Social
relativism is in direct opposition with moral realism because it denies every one of the
aforementioned positions that are required to be a moral realist. Relativism raises a few questions
about moral realism, but mainly because it does not require any of the metaphysical
commitments that moral realism requires as a theory. Relativism is a very appealing theory
because it requires none of the metaphysical baggage that comes with the other theories, and
instead focuses on the actors in a society and what they say to determine what is right and wrong
for that group.
Moral relativism is a theory backed by both Michel de Montaigne and David Hume,
although both seem to not hold it with complete conviction. Montaigne was a French egoist
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philosopher who wrote his three Essays in 1580, 1588, and 1595.6 Montaigne was interested in
presenting his thoughts about the world he was living in and offer explanations of them, most of
which were ideas that raised issues against the world. Montaigne was very skeptical about the
functions of the world and the thoughts at the forefront of society during his life. At the time,
Roman Catholicism was dominant in the Western World; thus, Catholic doctrine also dominated
moral thought. The moral thought that the Catholic Church preached was moral realism. The
form of moral realism the Catholic Church followed stated that these morals existed because God
created them, and they are objective because God is the source of morals for all.7 Theists also
hold all the other ideas that non-theists realists follow.8
Montaigne dedicated much of his essays to the calling into question the ideas of society,
and this included the predominant moral thought. Montaigne, through his questioning, began
defending a view that was later known as moral relativism. Montaigne argued that it is custom
that leads us to believe that there are moral truths that all hold.9 We are led to believe that the
moral values we hold are true because everyone in that society also follows them, when in
reality, it is only that specific society that holds those exact moral grounds. Montaigne argued
that “the common fancies that we find in repute everywhere about us and infused into our minds
with the seed of our fathers, appear to be the most universal and genuine,” but, he argues they are
not universal and apply only to the society that holds them.10 Since morality is the product of
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custom and belief, and these customs and beliefs vary by place and time, morality cannot be
universal, and so moral realism cannot be true. We are simply following the customs around us
that have no backing from any tangible proof and ignoring the reality of the differences seen in
different places in the world. One can clearly see why one would support relativism, especially
in today’s society; moral relativism is tangible, is seen as more material, and is derived from the
people in the society. These are all things that are valued by today’s society and are seen as more
concrete than abstract ideas. Custom is also a very important idea to make note of because it
influences our reasoning for acting in the ways we do, especially when it comes to our moral
actions.
Moral realism must have an answer for the claims that Montaigne is making that do have
merit. I will start by saying that Montaigne himself did not fully endorse this viewpoint either.
His goal in writing the Essays is to call into question the beliefs of his time and to question the
reality of the universe and what drives actions, so as to not blindly follow the ideas that preceded
him. Montaigne did exactly as he set out to do and has influenced many later philosophers with
his line of questioning. Montaigne himself was also a devout Christian that believed in the
supremacy of God, and the rule of God’s moral guidelines.11 This shows that even one that gives
an argument for the position does not favor it because he recognized some of the flaws of it. This
does not prove that the moral relativism is not valid, only that there are flaws that even a
proponent of it recognizes. Shafer-Landau also noticed some of the major flaws that come with
moral relativism. Relativists either argue that morality is relative to the society or the individual.
This is a problem because, on the one side, if one believes that it is society dictating moral law,
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then it does not follow that the individual would follow society’s morals. This is because it
assumes that morality had to have come from individuals at one point.12 If society’s moral laws
have been dictated by the masses, then it is clear that these ideas came from the individuals. On
the flip side, if morality is derived from the individuals, then why do we as a society value
similar moral ideals?13 If it was only subjective to the individual, then rarely would one see a
repeat of the same values, much less in so many different areas of the world. Relativism cannot
make a decisive decision when it comes to how moral rule comes about because it is either
society or the individual, but it requires both in order to allow for subjective morality to be the
moral rule in a society. Relativism cannot have both, but it needs both to function. These are not
even the biggest issues with Montaigne’s version of moral relativism though, specifically his
notion of custom and its influence on moral decisions.
Montaigne’s conception of custom is the basis for his rationale for relativism, but this is
not foolproof either. He is claiming that our opinions, conduct, and references to universal truths,
like reason and morality, all are illusory and hold no truth.14 He says all this, and yet, in his
Essays, he is very critical of some of the customs seen around the world. Instead of endorsing
that these views are morally correct according to the society they are found in, he instead makes
claims about some of them being incorrect. In his section On Cannibals, Montaigne first praises
them for holding true to their values, but then later on criticizes them for actions that are morally
vicious. When talking about the new world, Montaigne says that “he finds nothing barbarous and
savage about this nation”15 and that:

12
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They are savages at the same rate that we say fruits are wild, which nature
produces of herself and by her own ordinary progress; whereas, in truth, we ought
rather to call those wild whose natures we have changed by our artifice and
diverted from the common order.16
In this statement he is clearly showing support for moral relativism because he feels that the
Native Americans are acting in accordance with how they are. They are not doing anything
wrong because they are choosing to act in the ways that they do, even if these customs do not fit
the European model. He then later states that “we may then call these people barbarous, in
respect to the rules of reason: but not in respect to ourselves, who in all sorts of barbarity exceed
them,”17 clearly showing that he is appealing to some form of objective morality. This is not him
appealing to realism, but simply showing that he does believe in moral objectivity because it
does not make sense that a moral relativist would critique one culture’s moral rules. Why does he
think this despite making an argument for moral relativism? Montaigne argues against relativism
because he sees commonalities between humans, nature, and animals that must be universally
respected. Montaigne says,
I meet with arguments that endeavor to demonstrate the near resemblance betwixt
us and animals, how large a share they have in our greatest privileges, and with
how much probability they compare us together, truly I abate a great deal of our
presumption, and willingly resign that imaginary sovereignty that is attributed to
us over other creatures. But supposing all this were not true, there is nevertheless
a certain respect, a general duty of humanity, not only to beasts that have life and
sense, but even to trees, and plants. We owe justice to men, and graciousness and
benignity to other creatures that are capable of it.18
Montaigne argues this because just by looking at the real world he can see that there are
objective rules that we follow regardless of our societal norms. We owe duty to our fellow
humans and other beings because it is a moral obligation that we have that is non-subjective.
16
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point of his essays were to bring up questions about the world; this does not mean that he does
not endorse some of his questioning, and that he does not need to be fully committed to it.
Montaigne is not the only philosopher that holds a moral relativist view. David Hume is another
philosopher that argues for moral relativism, but he seems to have more conviction to its truth.
David Hume is a later philosopher that also seems to endorse moral relativism, also on
the idea that it is custom that drives morality. David Hume is not normally seen as a moral

relativist, but I have found multiple articles that argue for him as one. David Hume published his
work titled An Enquiry into the Source of Morals in 1751, during the time of the Enlightenment,
where he refers to the idea of custom that Montaigne used. Hume uses custom in a way that is
slightly different to the way that Montaigne uses it. Montaigne uses custom to explain why we
act in certain way, specifically as to why we do certain things in a society, whether that be in
physical or moral action.19 Hume does not use this notion of custom. Hume instead uses custom
to explain why we “know” anything at all. Hume goes over his view of custom in An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, and his view of custom is as follows:
It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far; without repining at the
narrowness of our faculties, because they will carry us no farther. And it is certain
we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we
assert, that, after the constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for
instance, weight and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to expect the
one from the appearance of the other.20
Hume is showing here that we make connections in the world because we follow causes and
effects and make connections between the two.21 Custom is what we do after we realize this

“Essays of Michel De Montaigne,” Chapter xxii.
David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” transcriber Peter Millican, Hume Texts Online
(Hume Texts Online), accessed April 9, 2022, https://davidhume.org/texts/e/full, E 5.5 SBN 43.
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relationship between a cause and effect. There is no real truth to what we do; it is only us merely
following custom. For example, we only “know” the sun rises in the east and sets in the west
because we have made the connection that it does this every day. We then believe that this is
truth because it happens every day. Hume thinks that we are simply following custom and
trusting that this will always happen. We do not really know that this will happen, but we end up
putting our trust in it because it has always seemed to do that. This is how Hume argues against
moral realism and is showing the reasoning he has as to why it fails. If everything is out of causal
relations and we follow them due to custom, then there is no real backing for real and objective
moral principles because we have no proof of their existence. This is Hume’s denial of moral
realism, and subsequent support of a seemingly moral relativist view, one that support moral
subjectivity.
After one has figured out what custom entails for that society, Hume argues that we use
utility to understand what is morally important for a society. Hume argues that what determines
if something fits in a societies moral code is if it provides utility to that society.22 But why does
the utility of a moral principle matter? Hume says that it matters because we are driven to find
what is desirable to us through the use of sentiment or feeling.23 If we feel that something is
undesirable, then we as a society deem that quality or action immoral. Feeling is what drives all
moral action in Hume’s view. Hume wants to relate sentiment to morality by saying that feeling
drives us to desire certain qualities. We find utility in these qualities and make them the moral
rules of that society. These rules are then perpetuated by that society due to custom; elders in a
society instill these qualities in those younger than them and they become the moral code of that
David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,” transcriber Peter Millican, Hume Texts Online
(Hume Texts Online), accessed April 9, 2022, https://davidhume.org/texts/m/full, M 5.3 SBN 214.
23
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society until some new feeling arises and replaces an old one. Utility and custom both matter in
context of determining what moral qualities a society deems desirable, but sentiment is the
ultimate factor for Hume when determining morals. Feelings are different for everyone and there
is no outside source that makes these truer for any one person over the other; thus, Hume is
arguing for relativism. He also does not have the issue that Montaigne runs into about the
individual and society because Hume clearly says that morality comes from the individual and
then is utilized by society due to the perceived benefits that everyone collectively agrees upon
produces the most utility.
Moral realism defends against Hume’s claim by denying that sentiment is the main driver
of morality. Shafer-Landau states that moral realists support the view that moral truths are real
regardless of any particular attitude towards that moral standard.24 A certain stance towards the
view does not make that standard wrong or right, but Shafer-Landau claims that in a particular
way, this still “accommodates the possibility that something’s rightness or admirability depends
crucially on an agent’s attitude.”25 The reason that he specifies that it is in a particular way is
because he is only saying that the two may align. Shafer-Landau specifies that:

The realist could allow that there is a strong conceptual connection between the
responses of a suitable characterized ideal observer and the content of moral
reality. But, for the realist, that would be because the ideal observer would never
fail to see what was right and wrong anyway. The responses of an ideal observer
would not be constitutive of moral truth, but merely bear a very close (perhaps
perfect) correlation with a set of truth whose conditions may be fixed without any
reference to such an observer.26

24
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This is how moral relativism can fit in a moral realist view according to Shafer-Landau, and I
think that it has merit. He is not denying the connections that Hume makes, but instead showing
that these connections can only be made accurately if the observer of a society was perfect.
Shafer-Landau is essentially saying that moral relativists stop short of find the real moral truths
and instead assume that it is their beliefs that drive moral rules. Shafer-Landau holds that
“realists do see moral judgements as beliefs, some of which are true, and true in virtue of
correctly reporting moral facts,”27 but they do not hold that these sentiments are what drive
morality. Feelings and beliefs maybe true, but they do not determine the truth of morals. I think
that Shafer-Landau’s argument is more compelling because it accounts for Hume’s thought
process while still maintaining his realist viewpoint. Hume’s theory, on the other hand, still
struggles due to its account for utility. Hume still wants to account for morals according to
feelings of the individual. This leaves Hume’s theory a little cornered because, on one hand,
utility may require one to do something that is wrong according to their feelings. This makes
Hume’s theory complicated because it cannot have both if this is the case; if feeling is preserved,
then utility cannot be fully utilized. The same idea applies in the opposite case. If utility is fully
realized, then sentiment must take a back seat.
This is similar to the case in the short story called The One’s Who Walk Away from
Omelas. In this short story, there is a perfect city called Omelas where everything continues to be
perfect so long as one person suffers for everyone else.28 Everyone continues to live perfectly as
long as everyone agrees to it, but those that do not have to leave and do not come back due to the

27
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horror they have seen. This story is intended to be a commentary on how a story need some type
of adversity to be seen as plausible, but this is also very similar to the situation that is set up in
Hume’s relativism argument. It could be argued that according to sentiment this is wrong, to
most people at least, but this produces the greatest utility for the society at large. Morals stem
from sentiment for Hume, but in the process of following sentiment, one may have to forgo the
utility produced because it goes against their beliefs. Hume has no answer for this discrepancy
because he must follow the idea that sentiment is where morality stems from, even though it
violates his notion of utility. Hume’s notion still struggles with Shafer-Landau’s issues with
Montaigne’s view because it still requires a transition from the individual to the society, even
though it is through utility. This is the exact issue that is raised in The One’s Who Walk Away
from Omelas. Although the individuals have certain sentiments, this does not mean that it is
reflected by the society, especially if utility is increased exponentially. This is something we still
see in today’s society, namely the continued use of sweat shops by large corporations. They
know what they are doing is morally wrong, according to sentiment-based relativism or moral
realism, but the utility they get out of it is so large that they do it anyways. Hume’s issue is that
he is unclear when it comes to situations such as this.
Some people, like Henrick Bohlin, argue that Hume has been misunderstood and is not
arguing for moral relativism at all. In his paper, “Universal Moral Standards and the Problem of
Cultural Relativism in Hume’s ‘A Dialogue,’” Bohlin argues that Hume is in fact a moral antirealist and not a moral relativist. Again, Hume is not traditionally seen as an antirealist either, but
Bohlin laid out a compelling argument that leads into a philosopher that fully endorses the view.
In A Dialogue, Hume discusses moral relativism and its problems, but Hume’s work has been
dismissed by Simon Blackburn for “depending on the simplistic assumption that cultures differ
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only in applying shared general principles to diverse circumstances.”29 Bohlin disagrees with
Blackburn’s assertion. In A Dialogue, Hume narrates companions traveling to a foreign land
where the narrator is ultimately appalled by the barbarous and savage customs that go against
human nature.30 Bohlin argues that Hume set it up in this way to show a distinct difference
between his view and relativism. He begins by talking about what he calls a rationally decidable
disagreement. Bohlin asserts that Hume is arguing that it is not only what people think is right
and wrong, but what is right or wrong that varies between cultures.31 This is not relativism
because it is not based on what people think, but on what is objectively right or wrong in a
society.
This is a view that moral anti-realists hold. Bohlin’s next section is about what is a
rationally comprisable disagreement, or arguments in which both sides can agree to the rational
and moral correctness of the others argument and still not subscribe to it.32 Bohlin says that there
are two types of rational comprisable disagreement: disagreement due to precision and minute
differences between some moral sentiments. Disagreement due to precision occurs in situations
where limits are not precise when it comes to what is morally right. A situation that Bohlin cites
is the limit to the closeness of family relations.33 It is seen as morally wrong to marry close
family, but it does not say how close is too close. Minute differences between moral sentiments
occurs because individuals have different feelings to different morals at different times. Bohlin’s
example to demonstrate this has to do with aesthetics. He shows how the Ancient Greeks would

Henrik Bohlin, “Universal Moral Standards and the Problem of Cultural Relativism in Hume’s ‘A Dialogue,”’
Philosophy 88, No. 346 (2013): 593–606, Http://Www.jstor.org/Stable/24779098.,” n.d., 593-94.
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find a woman with a low forehead and a unibrow as the pinnacle of beauty, but few eighteenth
century Britons would find this attractive.34 This is the same with moral sentiments because one
age may think one thing is moral, but then a later one may not. Bohlin point is that although
there are disagreements that cannot be solved, this does not matter because anti-realists hold that
there is no truth value to moral claims. The third point the Bohlin makes is about rationally
uncompromisable disagreements. This occurs when someone has corrupted moral sentiments and
no argument can change the opinion of the other side. People get this corrupted view because of
the people they grow up around, their own self-interests, location and time period, and the
amount of people they have in their lives.35 This is how Hume shows that objectivity is not
affected by contrasting beliefs. One side clearly has corrupted sentiments, thus does not ruin the
objectivity of moral sentiments. Bohlin argues that Hume shows objectivity, but not truth, in
moral sentiments. This is a form of moral anti-realism and not moral relativism, more
specifically error theory.
Bohlin’s conception of Hume’s moral theory is most akin to error theory. Error theorists
hold that when one uses moral language, they do talk about what is wrong and right, but they
deny that there really are any opinion-independent moral properties, even though we treat them
as if they are true.36 Error theorists can be objectivists, but that does not mean that they think that
these objective properties are real or hold any truth value. Moral “truths” to error theorists are as
real as unicorns. They hold that there is no proof that moral laws exist according to any natural
sciences, there is no proof to uphold moral realists’ idea for the non-natural properties they hold,
and thus they deny that they exist. Hume in Bohlin’s interpretation takes an error theorist stance
“Universal Moral Standards and the Problem of Cultural Relativism in Hume’s ‘A Dialogue,”’ 597.
Ibid., 600.
36
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34
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because Hume seems to deny that there are moral laws, but seems to insist that we follow as if
they do exist objectively. This stance is what an error theorist could hold regarding moral laws
and why we follow what moral laws we do.
The foremost proponent of error theory is John Mackie. In his book Ethics: Inventing
Right and Wrong, Mackie argues that there are no objective values, that “moral laws” do not
contain any goodness or value, and that they are not part of the fabric of the universe.37 Although
Mackie appears to be a moral skeptic, he is not. A moral skeptic is one “who rejects morality and
will take no notice of it.”38 Mackie is not taking this stance. He is instead focused on how moral
laws fit into the world, even though he thinks these laws do not hold any real value. He rejects
moral law as being a real thing, but he is noticing how it affects the world regardless of it not
being real. We hold moral laws to be true and objective, even though they do not really exist
according to Mackie. One of the challenges that Mackie must answer is how moral laws can be
objective, even though they do not exist. Mackie says that objectivity has been misconstrued as
descriptivism. Descriptivism is the theory about the meaning of ethical terms in a descriptive
manner as opposed to prescriptive or evaluative.39 When moral law is said to be prescriptive it
means that the claim the individual makes has no truth value and is merely the individual
providing their moral convictions. Moral laws, if they are to be seen as objective, must be
prescriptive and not descriptive, because they revolve around how things ought to be and not
how they are evaluated to be.40 It is important to note this, because if moral laws are descriptive,
then we are not trying to understand moral laws as they should be. Instead, we are trying to

37
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evaluate them for what we understand them to be, not as they ought to be. With this
understanding, moral laws can be objective under Mackie’s moral error theory while still not be
real. If moral laws are understood to be prescriptive, Mackie’s error theory can stand to say that
moral laws can seem to be objective.
This can appear to many to go against their common view of morality. Mackie knows
that his error theory seems to go against the common view, and it must be defended to the utmost
degree to convince others of its merit.41 He gives to view of moral error theory, relativism and
queerness, in which he gives more merit to the latter due to its more general applicability.
Mackie states that it has two parts: a metaphysical part and an epistemological one. Mackie says
that:
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations
of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.
Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special
faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways
of knowing everything else.42
This is the iteration of error theory that he proposes; it shows why we follow moral laws
objectively while still allowing him to be able to claim that they do not exist. Formulating his
error theory in this way allows him to claim that we cannot know what is objective and what is
not. It allows him to define his own moral law while still allowing him to reject their objectivity.
If moral laws are objective and only knowable through “some special faculty of moral
perception,” then there is no way to be sure that the moral laws we follow are not fictitious, and
we simply follow them because it is what we think are the correct moral actions in that
circumstance. They can be objective, but Mackie insists that we have made an error in assuming
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that they are a real part of the universe and not laws that we follow arbitrarily due to our own
thinking. This is not relativism, since Mackie is not saying that we follow whatever we
subjectively feel. Instead, we accept “an objective moral” and follow it how we think it applies
subjectively.
Mackie further argues that moral laws can be interpreted differently and still remain
universal. Mackie uses the example of the golden rule to illustrate this. The rule says, “Do not do
unto others as you would have that they should do unto you,” but this leaves open many
possibilities for how to interpret it.43 Not everyone has the same feelings about what happens to
them, and thus individuals have justification to do vastly different things depending on their
stance. Each individual will still be ruled by “an objective moral law,” but they will not be
following it exactly the same as the other. His reflections on individuals’ reactions/adherence to
morality explain Mackie’s ideas regarding the differences in personal moral codes despite many
claiming that moral laws are objective. We have made an error, according to Mackie, in thinking
that moral laws are a real part of the universe with only one correct moral answer. Mackie
suggests that just because there seems to be a moral law that is applicable to all does not mean
that that law is actually a part of the universe, and it can be exploited however one desires.
Mackie does not subscribe to the idea that there is a moral law that truly binds us, there are only
objective ideas that we can use how we wish. Moral laws are not real for Mackie, and he argues
that they are able to be manipulated to best suit what we need or feel.
Moral realists obviously have qualms with Makie’s analyses, because he directly denies
the existence of moral laws. Moral realists do not really have an issue with Mackie’s conception
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of morality being objective, as it is akin to how they view moral laws. However, realists reject
his claims that moral laws do not exist. Objectivity for a moral realist means that moral laws
apply to all moral agents in the universe. These objective moral laws must be prescriptive as well
because they describe how the universal moral law should be and not necessarily how it is in
actuality. These laws are seen as a part of the fabric of the universe in the moral realist view, so
they stand as the ultimate definition of moral truths. However, there are a few key differences
between the moral realist’s conception of objectivity and the moral error theorist’s conception of
it. As Shafer-Landau explains in Moral Realism: A Defense:
The key virtues of a [moral realist’s] objectivist views are three: they capture the
impartiality of the moral perspective, preserve the categorical nature of moral
demands, and provide a plausible view of the nature of moral error.44
What Shafer-Landau is saying is that moral realism’s conception of objectivity in the moral law
must be prescriptive, but it also allows for a descriptive element as well. As mentioned above,
descriptivism is the theory about the meaning of emoral terms in a descriptive manner. 45
Descriptivism is a way to describe how moral reasoning actually is, and not how moral reasoning
ought to be according to the moral law. This is important because moral realists are concerned
with moral laws being a part of the universe. One goal of moral realism is to eventually
understand and know these moral laws, and then be able to say what moral errors we have been
making as moral agents. As a moral realist, it is important to understand what moral errors we
have been making and try to rectify these mistakes if we wish to understand the moral laws. This
is distinct from error theory, because error theorists do not care about knowing what moral
reasoning is actually like in the world. They argue that morals are not real. For an error theorist,
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there is no point in trying to know what moral mistakes we are making, because technically
every moral action we make cannot be simply broken down into right or wrong. Shafer-Landau
uses the example of the Nazis in World War II to explain this issue. Moral error theorists do not
focus on the descriptive at all, and this can lead to ignoring actual moral mistakes being made.
As is the case with the Nazis, the horrible things that they did to the Jews and other minority
groups cannot be appealed to some higher moral standard, because they are not seen as real.46
Moral issues ought to be some way objectively analyzed, but there is not overarching moral law
that says what individuals are doing is wrong. Error theorists cannot appeal to these universal
moral laws because they do not think that they are real. Furthermore, they suggest that things like
what the Nazis did cannot be said to be wrong objectively. This objection to moral error theory’s
idea of objectivity stems from the fact that morals are not real for them. This ultimately is the
biggest contradiction between moral realism and error theory.
Mackie thinks that no class of natural properties has any distinctive opinion-independent
feature that makes them worthy of being called “moral properties”.47 Thus, there are no moral
laws. Although we do make moral judgements, we are not actually making any judgement
according to error theorists. Statements like “John is good” or “Killing is wrong” ultimately have
no meaning for Mackie, because he thinks that there is no feature of the universe that makes
these ideals moral laws. He bases morality on opinions of what goodness is, and he thinks that
the moral laws cannot be opinion independent, thus moral laws are not credible.48 They are only
opinions and not objective on their own, even though we treat them as such. Mackie argues that
we cannot know these moral laws, because they are intelligible to us, as moral realists hold.
46
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Moral realists answer this by saying that just because we do not know these moral laws, since we
do not have the faculties for it, does not mean that these moral properties do not exist. These
moral laws are intelligible to us, and so it is very possible that they do exist even though we
cannot know them. Just because we cannot know these moral laws as humans, does not mean
that they do not exist.
Moral error theorists also assert that there is nothing about these “moral laws” that makes
them worthy of being laws, mainly because they do not follow natural principles. This is wrong
to assert, because moral realists are not claiming that moral laws follow natural laws. Moral
realists hold that there is a domain in which moral laws exist that is non-natural or not
explainable by natural science, and that is why we have no access to them.49 These maybe akin
to how number theory acts. It is not entirely natural, but still applies to our lives. The promote
the welfare of moral agents, and therefore we must care about following them. Mackie feels that
they are not worthy of being laws, as there is no evidence of them and they cannot be proven,
thus they lack credibility of universal governability. Although we cannot know them, they do not
necessarily lack credibility. Mackie would need to prove that they lack credibility through some
proof that these non-natural laws do not apply to moral agents. Mackie has not done so, and his
arguments do not demonstrate their lack of credibility. He simply denies their credibility due to
being non-natural. Mackie is looking at moral properties through an a posteriori lens, meaning
that we must be able to know and experience this knowledge through the five senses. Whereas
moral realists, like Shafer-Landau, hold that we can know these moral laws through an a priori
lens, meaning one that we can access through reason alone.50 Mackie examines these laws
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through a naturalist lens that differs from non-natural moral realists like Shafer-Landau. His
perspective causes him to conclude that they are not credible when they actually do hold
credibility when analyzed through reason rather than the senses. Mackie makes a rash conclusion
based only on experience when we should be considering much more when studying something
that we do not understand fully, like moral laws and how they act on moral agents in the universe
Additionally, Mackie rejects realism. He concludes that his knowledge/understanding of
the world, experienced through his senses, maintains that there are many different cultures and
societies in the world and yet there are not many convergences of moral laws.51 This emphasizes
Mackie’s second view of error theory that originates from relativity rather than queerness and
focuses on how morals seem to be relative even as we deem them to be objective. This concept
differs from moral relativity, because he still holds that we appeal to moral laws as being
objective, but the laws seem to be relative in that there is no consensus on what they ought to be.
He concludes that there is no convergence or morality based on empirical fact, and therefore
moral realism is not true.52
Mackie relies on the fact that we do not see the same moral codes in all societies in the
world. This argument is not as strong, as there are some moral rules seen in different societies
that are similar to one another. It also stands to reason that some societies do not have the same
advancements that others do and so they cannot make the same moral decisions.53 This would
greatly influence the way the society makes moral decisions and how they can perceive different
situations. This is like the ancient Spartans that would kill any infant that was seen as weak or
having a disability, since they were too weak for the society. Now-a-days we know that this is
51
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not the case and is morally wrong, because we have progressed as a society to help those that
may have disabilities. Such changes in understanding have been possible due to the greater use
and advancement of social understanding that allows us to realize morally wrong actions. We
have used this growth to foster better understanding of one another, and this has caused us to
realize these actions were morally wrong. We could eventually be able to know the moral truths
Mackie questions if we keep improving our moral discourse so that we can know non-natural
truths of the universe. This change can be seen throughout time and all over the world. Societies
increasingly have begun to have similar moral codes, because we are becoming more attune to
these moral laws. We may never fully reach understanding of these laws, but we can try our best
to keep improving our knowledge and hope to find them through our reason.
Realists are committed to the use of reason to discover these moral truths. Realism is a
form of cognitivism.54 Cognitivism, as Shafer-Landau puts it:
[Cognitivism] allows for a central class of judgements within a domain to count
as beliefs, capable of being true of false in virtue of their more or less accurate
representation of the facts within the domain. Realists see moral judgements as
beliefs, some of which are true, and true in virtue of correctly reporting moral
facts.55
Shafer-Landau is saying that realists contend that there is a domain of moral laws that are
correctly reporting moral judgements. This is known as cognitivism. Every realist is a
cognitivist, but not every cognitivist is a realist. Realists hold that some of our beliefs are belong
to this domain, but we do not have all the correct beliefs or judgements so not all of them exist in
this domain. This is why we see moral error in the world and have not come to a collective
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agreement about moral laws. If we were able to use our reason to deduce these truths, then moral
error would not occur.
Furthermore, non-cognitivism opposes moral realism. Non-cognitivists, as the name
suggests, deny the cognitive element of moral realism, and by extension deny moral realism.
Non-cognitivists hold that when we make moral statements, in reality, we are not saying
anything with truth value at all, and we are not trying to aim at truth in the first place.56 It is our
emotions that motivate us to act and thus incorporate our desires into our actions.57 Moral
statements are thus inert and have no truth value in them. It is as if one is just making a statement
and not one with moral inclinations. Non-cognitivism functions on the idea that when one makes
a moral statement then they are trying to get the other to appeal to their emotional stance and
believe in their position.58 They reject objectivity in ethical debates and thus also deny the actual
existence of these truths. I think that non-cognitivism will pose one of the more threatening
challenges of the positions that I have mentioned above. I think that it is the most threatening
because it denies everything that realism stands for, whereas the other views hold one thing or
another that realists also hold. Relativism holds that our moral ideas can become better as society
continues to develop and error theory holds that moral laws are objective, but non-cognitivism
denies both claims. I think this makes it more threatening because it denies everything that
realism stands for and it denies moral laws in a way that is significantly different from error
theory, the other anti-realist view.
Richard Gardner is a proponent of non-cognitivism, and he argues for it in his piece titled
“Abolishing Morality.” He discusses how the idea of abolishing morality is a difficult
56
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undertaking because moral language is so imbedded in every part of our lives.59 It is a part of our
speech, our place in the world, and how we have solved major issues in the past like slavery and
torture.60 Morality and the idea that we follow moral laws is hard to part with because it is so
integral to how we behave. Non-cognitivists, like Gardner, deny all moral laws and thoughts that
we have because it claims that none of these really exist. Gardner instead claims that noncognitivists:

Are expressing our feelings, emotions, attitudes, or stances, and/or attempting to
influence the attitudes or behaviors of others…. Non-cognitivists are rarely
troubled by our use of moral language to express attitudes and behaviors of
others.61
Non-cognitivists hold that when we claim something is a “moral rule/law” we are merely
expressing our opinions and not making any moral claims because there are none to appeal to.
Moral laws are nonexistent for non-cognitivists. Saying that, “John is a bad person because he
steals and this is morally wrong,” would be equivalent to saying, “The dog would like a bone to
chew on.” We are only making expressions of our ideals with no moral claims actually being
made. This also means that every claim we make is subjective and does not apply to every moral
agent universally. It is only the individual’s opinions being expressed to others. This is a stark
contrast to moral realism because they claim there are no objective moral laws.
The basic formulation of non-cognitivism follows as such. Cognitivism holds that what
ought to be is based on belief in moral laws, beliefs are not intrinsically motivating us to act,
only desire does this.62 Internalism, or what we desire from inside ourselves alone, holds that
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moral judgments are intrinsically motivating, therefore cognitivist views and internalism cannot
exit together.63 Gardner, and other non-cognitivist, hold that because belief does not motivate us
to act in certain manners, whether that be morally or not, that moral laws must not be true and it
must be that it is our own wants and desires that make us act how we do. They also say that
moral claims, by extension, also do not hold any weight because it is only the desire of each
individual expressing themselves. Moral realists find issue with non-cognitivists because of their
idea that belief does not motivate individuals to act.
This is an argument that dates back all the way to Hume who claims that “the passions”
motivate and that reason, or belief, is motivationally inert.64 This is known as Humeanism.
Internalism and Humeanism put moral realists in a corner it seems because one either reject
Humeanism and accepts that morals come from our desire, or you reject internalism and hold
that belief is unmotivating alone. This is an interesting assertion because I think that it refuses to
acknowledge the idea that it could be the other way around. A moral realist can reject both
Humeanism and internalism. I think that it is belief and reason that incites us to act as well, but
in a different way from the passions. Our reason makes us do certain things because we believe
them to be the correct course of action. Passion makes us act because we feel that we must do
something, not necessarily making the correct choice in the process because we are blinded by
them. When we act according to the passions we simply do “things” because we cannot follow a
defined idea due to overwhelming emotion. However, action through belief is because we have
rationally thought about the action and realize we must carry it out in order to fulfill the goal
before us. Passion can also force one to not act, due to being overwhelmed with our emotions.
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Moral realists understand that passion can be a useful tool to get to the moral law, but it is the
belief that they exist that motivates us to act so we can understand them. Shafer-Landau affirms
this position stating that:
I reject Humeanism and am proposing to reject internalism as well. That is
inconsistent. This is close but not quite right. Non-cognitivists have made an error
in assuming that belief is unmotivating when it comes to action. Rejecting
Humeanism entails that some beliefs are intrinsically motivating. But evaluative
beliefs (including specifically moral beliefs) might be intrinsically motivating
without being necessarily motivation. And internalism is a thesis about necessary
motivation. So one may reject Humeanism without also embracing internalism. If
Humeanism is false, then a belief, when it motivates, may motivate in virtue of its
own nature and content, either entirely without the aid of ancillary affective states,
or by means of generating such states.65
He is saying that belief can be motivating intrinsically, but it does not require the “necessary”
motivation of desire to be motivating in how we act. One may be intrinsically motivated by their
moral desires, but that does not mean that it is the desire that is making the individual act. This
also does not mean that they are only motivated because of their desires like Humeanism holds.
They are motivated because they intrinsically are acting because of the moral law itself and not
because of their desires. Non-cognitivism refuses to acknowledge this possibility and this is very
plausible. This is not the only issue with non-cognitivism.
There are more issues with non-cognitivism than just the idea that belief cannot motivate.
Non-cognitivism also falters because it does not have a straightforward analysis of moral
arguments. Cognitivism, and moral realism by extension, does not have this issue. When we
make a moral argument, we do assess whether the argument is sound or unsound, valid, or
invalid. This shows that when we make a moral argument and analyze it, we are concerned with
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truth-preservation as an aim of the moral argument.66 Non-cognitivism cannot evaluate moral
claims based on truth-preservation like moral realism can. This issue is known as Frege’s Abyss,
as first noted by Blackburn.67 Non-cognitivists can make sense of sameness of meaning in
asserted and unasserted contexts, and they must do this if they are to remain logical validity in
moral arguments.68 They run into issue though because moral argumentation utilizes assertions,
negations, disjunctions and conditionals. This is an issue because one’s assertion of a claim
changes depending on whether they are using one of these argumentation techniques. Moral
predicates are meaningful and can describe the subjects they are concerned with.69 This is a
natural and simple way of communication of moral talk that non-cognitivism cannot do. ShaferLandau gives a great example of this with his explanation of virtue deserving a reward. As he
explains, cognitivists acknowledge that there is “such a thing as virtue, and dessert, and
reward.”70 However, for non-cognitivists “we are not describing a virtue and saying of it that is
has some property that of deserving reward.”71 There is no such moral property for noncognitivists that would warrant dessert or punishment because everything is from the desire of
the individual. This causes a massive issue for the legal system as well because non-cognitivism
holds that reward and punishment for moral failing does not apply because it is simply desire of
the individuals. They do not have a concrete answer to this issue at all. They struggle with saying
that “x deserves y” because, even though they may be able to account for dessert, they cannot
account for other cases such as “wouldn’t it be nice were x to get y?” or “it’s good that x has
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y.”72 Even if they can somehow get past this issue they still have the problem with this because
they believe that virtue is inert, or it means nothing. So, even if they can get past the first issue,
there is nothing to serve as the object of such approvals in the examples above.73 This dilemma
does not exist for moral realists because they talk about moral laws and actions in these types of
terms every time morality is in the equation. Moral realism clearly has an edge here the noncognitivism cannot answer.
This has been a theme throughout the entirety of my thesis. Moral realism has answers to
moral questions in a simpler manner than the other three do. Not only is it simpler, it also is
expressed in a manner that seems more in tune with how the everyday person discusses morality.
Moral relativism struggles because of placing where morals come from and relying upon
sentiment as the driving force for why societies attach themselves to them without ever giving
clear reasoning for how or why this occurs. Error theory struggles because they rely all their
judgements on natural laws without considering the possibility of non-natural ones. Error theory
also falters because it relies on a posteriori observation and does not think that a priori ones
have the potential to explain moral laws. Non-cognitivism struggles because it goes about talking
about moral dilemmas in a manner that fails to explain some of the nuances in moral discussion.
Non-cognitivists cannot deal with certain moral questions because of their disregard of the moral
law altogether. All the problems that the other views struggle with are not an issue for moral
realism because it claims that the moral laws stem from a non-natural source, that is objective for
all, can be known through reason but does not discount the importance of sentiments, and it
allows for more natural discussion of “just desserts” because it acknowledges moral principles
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like virtue and vice. Moral realism can account for all these theories shortcomings and has
answers for its own.
Moral realism is the most consistent of the theories that I have brought up, and it is able
to refute the claims they make against it. Moral realists make up roughly 56% of all philosophers
when it comes to their moral views.74 This is because it is the most convincing of all the
metaphysical moral stances. Moral realism has been around for longer than the other theories,
and thus has had the time to be more fleshed out and able to deal with its weaknesses better than
the other ones. Moral realism has stayed consistent throughout history and has maintained its
position that moral laws are objective for all moral agents and may be unknowable to humans,
but that we must still strive to make the correct moral decisions according to them. This has
shaped these other theories because they all have formed in opposition to it. Along this line of
thinking, it shows that moral realism has been the most dominant and compelling theory, the one
that the others have tried to dethrone. These other theories have popped up because of how
controversial and important of a topic morality is in one’s everyday life.
Moral laws are what dictate the moral principles that we apply in our everyday live, and
moral realism is the theory that backs these laws and holds them as the standard that we, as
moral agents, must strive to achieve. Moral laws are objective for all moral agents, nonnaturalistic in nature, and are applicable to all these agents. Moral realism encapsulates all of
these and defends this view in a manner that is much stronger and more consistent than the other
theories. Moral relativism, error theory, and non-cognitivism all attempt to debunk this way of
thinking but each one falls short for different reasons. Moral realism as a theory encapsulated all
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compelling and correct theory of moral thought. So, when one asks, “what is morality at is
core?” they must think of moral realism as the answer to this question.
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